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Abstract Environmental agreements represent voluntary coalitions which mostly
regulate emissions and the exhaustion of natural resources. The analysis of why and
under which conditions countries (or policy makers) may be inclined toward ratifying
such agreements or not has been the focus of a body of theoretical work at the inter-
face of environmental economics and the economics of coalition games. Traditional
theoretical work predicted that environmental agreements are hard to sustain due to
the lacking enforceability of associated contracts and the incentive to free-ride. This
hypothesis is at odds with the enormous surge of such agreements in reality over the
last few decades. Recent work by Rose and Spiegel (J. Money, Credit Bank. 41:337–
363, 2009) suggests that environmental agreements will be signed and are stable,
because they work as a signal and help economies to get access to export (and pos-
sibly other) credits. Hence, the reason for a ratification of such agreements is their
interdependence with other policies, especially ones that are related to international
business. This paper sheds light on the determinants of multilateral environmental
agreement (MEA) participation. In particular, we pay attention to the role of a coun-
try’s international openness by means of chosen trade and investment policies for
such participation. The results support the view that wealthier countries with a strong
inclination towards trade and investment liberalization are more in favor of commit-
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ting themselves voluntarily to environmental standards, pollution reduction, and other
means of environmental protection through MEA memberships than other countries,
all else equal.
Keywords Environmental economics · Environmental agreements · Multilateral
agreements · Dynamic panel data · Count data
JEL Classification C23 · C25 · Q50 · Q56 · F18
1 Introduction
. . . environmentalist non-governmental organizations view free trade pure with
suspicion. (Frank Trentman, Free Trade Nation, Oxford University Press, 2008,
p. 23)
Freeness of trade and multinational investment are often seen as major obsta-
cles to the protection of natural resources and the avoidance or reduction of emis-
sions.1 Yet, parallel to the spread of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment
agreements, we observed an enormous surge of memberships in bilateral and—more
importantly—in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) over the last four
decades.2 The first MEA of our sample—the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in
the Quarantine of Plants and Their Protection Against Pests and Diseases—has been
ratified in 1960, it covered 8 countries and dealt with plant protection. Until 2006,
another 353 MEAs have been enacted. By that year, the median country among the
186 most important economies was involved in no less than 51 MEAs. An obvious
question to ask is whether the large number of environmental agreements has been
ratified in spite or rather because of the almost ubiquitous liberalization of trade and
investment.
From the perspective of traditional theoretical work on environmental coalitions
(see Chander and Tulkens 1992; Finus and Rundshagen 1998a, 1998b; Finus et al.
2006; Hoel 1992; Hoel and Schneider 1997; Carraro et al. 2006; Murdoch and San-
dler 1997; Naghavi 2005; Lange and Vogt 2003; Lise and Tol 2004; Barrett and
1For instance, Greenpeace (2003a, p. 1) argues that “The free trade agenda is increasing the production
and consumption of natural resources at a rapid rate. This is adding to the destruction of ancient forests,
leading to overfishing, as well as creating more and more pollution. WTO rules are also being used to
undermine global environmental agreements, principles and standards”. Moreover, Greenpeace (2003b,
p. 1) notes that “Trade rules can undermine environmental rules, laws and regulations. [. . . ] Because of
this, countries are less likely to take action under certain global environmental agreements.” Finally, they
state that “Free trade is accelerating the use of natural resources such as water, forests, fisheries, and min-
erals, much faster than they can be regenerated.” While these remarks mostly pertain to the consequences
of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)—and, hence, multilateral trade liberalization—
environmental activists have similar reservations vis-à-vis the formation of preferential trade agreements
(see Hanyona 2000; Hochstetler 2002, 2003).
2MEAs may be grouped into five categories relating to the target of environmental protection: biodiver-
sity; atmosphere; land; chemicals and hazardous wastes; and regional seas and related agreements. Their
objectives and priorities vary significantly not only across these groups but even within them.
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Stavins 2003; Barrett 1994, 2001; Buchholz et al. 2005) the surge in MEA mem-
berships is puzzling. Such membership is voluntary and there is no supranational in-
stitution to enforce commitments expressed in the associated contracts. Hence, when
interpreting environmental agreements as ones that are ratified in isolation of other
means of economic policy, there is little reason for countries to adopt costly mea-
sures required to fulfill their voluntary contracts. However, environmental agreements
are only one dimension of a large array of economic policies, among them other
agreements regarding trade, investment, health, etc. With a manifold of international
agreements, it may be optimal for a country to voluntarily commit itself to costly
environmental protection if it can influence economic outcomes (e.g., through other
agreements) which are only indirectly or not at all related to environmental issues. In
that vein, Rose and Spiegel (2009) argue and illustrate that participation in bilateral
environmental agreements provides a signal which leads to easier access to capital
assets from partners in such agreements.
It is this paper’s task to shed light on the determinants of a country’s MEA
memberships empirically. In particular, we investigate how trade liberalization, e.g.,
through membership in preferential trade agreements, or investment liberalization
affect MEA membership. Clearly, membership in MEAs is mainly reflective of en-
vironmental protection. Are trade and investment liberalization stepping stones or
stumbling blocks to MEA membership and, in turn, to environmental protection?
We collect data on the universe of MEAs ratified between 1960 and 2006 to as-
sess this question. Our results suggest that international economic coalitions about
trade and cross-border direct investment stimulate MEA memberships. This pro-
vides broad support for the arguments of Rose and Spiegel (2009): An increasing
dependence of countries upon each other through the process of globalization stim-
ulates or raises the pressure to agree upon eventually costly environmental protec-
tion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section pro-
vides a review of previous research on the ratification of environmental agreements.
Section 3 explores key features of the data on MEA membership in a large panel of
countries and years. In particular, this section will illustrate that such memberships
are highly persistent so that dynamic methods should be applied in empirical work.
Different impacts provoking countries to ratify MEAs are discussed in Sect. 4, and
Sect. 5 briefly introduces the econometric methods applied to estimate the regression
parameters of interest. Section 6 presents and discusses the findings and quantifies the
impact of trade and investment liberalization on MEA memberships. The last section
concludes with a summary of the most important results.
2 Previous work on environmental agreement membership
For convenience, let us structure the discussion of the state of the debate about envi-
ronmental agreement membership along the lines of theoretical and empirical work.
2.1 Economic theory of environmental agreements
Economic theory emphasizes the public good character of a clean environment. One
reason why environmental agreements are hard to reach is the prisoners’ dilemma as-
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sociated with the public good character of the environment. As an example, Weikard
et al. (2006) analyze the stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under
different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. Due to the prisoners’
dilemma, only coalitions with a few members turn out to be stable under different
sharing rules. Among many other theoretical works (see Sect. 1), this demonstrates
the difficulty to ratify MEAs.
Other papers emphasize the role of communications and negotiations in order
to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma associated with the signature or ratification of
MEAs (see Carraro 1998; Bloch and Gomes 2006; Caparrós et al. 2004; Carraro
et al. 2005).3
In contrast to the above work, Breton et al. (2008) focus on the dynamics of in-
ternational environmental agreement memberships in a dynamic game of emissions.
Their model of the evolution and stability of such agreements can lead to different
steady states of full cooperation or partial cooperation, which are stable over time,
and also to situations without feasible or stable agreements. The outcome depends on
the number of initially cooperating countries, the level of pollution, and the way and
extent to which defectors may be punished.
Rose and Spiegel (2009) study the consequences of the interaction between eco-
nomic and non-economic relations for environmental agreement membership. An in-
crease in the number of environmental agreements has a positive impact on cross-
holding assets. A larger number of such agreements represents a non-economic com-
mitment to joint interests which is a credible signal for a country’s discount rate. In
turn, this facilitates economic exchange in general and stimulates the cross-holding
of assets in specific.
2.2 Empirical analysis of environmental agreements
Previous empirical work on the formation of environmental coalitions and agree-
ments either focused on single multilateral agreements or on a subset of the exist-
ing bilateral or multilateral agreements. Others focus on a small subset of countries
or regions (see Beron et al. 2003; Murdoch et al. 2003; Davies and Naughton 2006;
Rose and Spiegel 2009; Frankel and Rose 2002; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006;
Tobey 1990; van Beers and van den Bergh 1997, 2000; Sugiyama and Sinton 2005;
Swanson and Mason 2002).
For instance, Beron et al. (2003) develop a correlated probit model to study
the probability to ratify the Montreal Protocol for the 89 largest countries of the
world economy. They distinguish above all between “power” and “spillover” de-
terminants of these countries. Power is reflected in the influence a country has on
the net benefit of ratifying the Montreal Protocol similar to positive network correla-
tions. “Spillovers” allow to internalize partly the detrimental effect of an emission of
3These theoretical models form the basis of some climate change simulation models—such as the
CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (CWS) (see Eyckmans and Tulkens 2003), the Stability of Coali-
tions Model (STACO) (see Finus et al. 2006), or the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and
Distribution (FUND) (see Swanson and Mason 2002; Tol 1997, 2001). These models suggest that the de-
tection of environmental depletion through climate change, the corresponding influences on the economy,
and the value of cooperation facilitate the ratification of environmental agreements.
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ozone-depleting substances on other countries than the emitting one. The higher the
contemporary emissions of a country the higher its relative cutback of emissions will
be and the more important its role in emission-reducing agreements should be. Ac-
cordingly, “spillovers” generate correlations in the decisions through trade with other
countries. However, Beron et al. (2003) did not find evidence of a role for “power”,
contrary to the hypotheses. But they admit that further research would be needed to
explore this matter.
Murdoch et al. (2003) focus on the ratification of the Helsinki Protocol (which
regulates sulfur emissions in Europe) in 1990. They derive hypotheses about envi-
ronmental treaty participation in a two-stage game. In a first stage, countries decide
whether to participate in an agreement at all or not. In a second stage, they determine
the level of participation or the extent of concessions made, i.e., emissions reduced.
Empirically, they employ a spatial probit model to estimate the probability of partic-
ipation in the Helsinki Protocol for 25 European countries to estimate the first-stage
part of their theoretical model. Their results suggest that a higher level of a country’s
pollution and the marginal costs of emission reductions exert a significant positive
impact on the probability of participation. Other variables do not display a significant
impact in the spatial binary choice model.
In a working paper, Davies and Naughton (2006) analyze the role of cross bor-
der pollution as an incentive to cooperate with neighboring countries in multilateral
environmental agreements. In particular, they hypothesize that the probability of an
environmental agreement in place declines with geographical distance between two
countries. They estimate the role of determinants of membership based on 41 coun-
tries, 37 international environmental agreements, and the period 1980–1999. Using
a spatial model for normally distributed, unlimited independent variables, and cross-
sectional data, they find evidence of increased cooperation among proximate coun-
tries. Moreover, an increase in inward FDI or OECD membership raise the probability
of participation in one of the 37 agreements.
Rose and Spiegel (2009) study the economic benefits of non-economic partner-
ships such as environmental agreements. Using a sample of 221 country-pairs and the
period 2001–2003, they provide empirical evidence of the increased cross-holdings
of assets at the country-pair level if an environmental agreement is in place. Hence,
countries may raise bilateral capital flows when participating in environmental agree-
ments. Their evidence suggests that this is true for both bilateral and multilateral
environmental agreement participation.
3 Data on MEA participation
Before turning to regression analysis, it is advisable to study features of the data
on MEA participation which will represent the dependent variable of our empirical
models. The basis of our MEA data forms the Socioeconomic Data and Applica-
tions Center’s (SEDAC) database on environmental agreements which is maintained
by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN 2006).
Among all existing MEAs, we focus on ones dealing with anyone of the five core
issues: biodiversity, atmosphere, land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and regional
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Fig. 1 Time course of the number of MEAs between 1960 and 2006
seas and related agreements. Hence, we abstract from other agreements which reg-
ulate economic, social, cultural, space, or noise issues. It turns out that SEDAC’s
database is not complete and contains some errors. Therefore, we augmented and up-
dated the information by using data from Mitchell (2003, 2007).4 This augmented
data set covers the universe of MEAs addressing the considered issues. Altogether,
353 such agreements have been ratified among subsets of the 186 countries between
1960 and 2006. The dependent variable we focus on varies across countries and
years. It is a count of the number of agreements a country is a member of in a year
within the considered time span. Since this variable is strictly non-negative, meth-
ods for unlimited dependent variables are unlikely appropriate for empirical analy-
sis.
After 1972, the year of the Stockholm Conference, the number of MEAs has risen
tremendously. Among others, because of the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, the
number of MEA memberships has also increased after 1989. Figure 1 illustrates that
MEA participation is not only but mainly a phenomenon in the developed part of the
world. Please notice that the number of MEAs of the European Union (EU) declines
in 2004.5 The reason for this has to do with the Eastern Enlargement of the European
Union which will be discussed later by means of Figs. 2 and 3.
4We gratefully acknowledge provision of the data by Ron Mitchell. As in the original data-set, only the
entry into force of MEAs is recorded. Hence, countries do not leave MEAs.
5In Fig. 1, we show the number of MEAs ratified by individual countries as well as country aggregates.
Among the latter are the European Union (EU), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the least developed countries (LDCs), and the world as a whole. Aggregates are represented
by the respective countries’ average number of MEAs in each year. As definitions of these aggregates can
change over time, the corresponding number of MEAs can form a—to some extent—unsteady but persis-
tent trend. For instance, within our data, the EU started with 6 members in 1969, enlarged to 10 members
in 1983, and finally contains 25 members in 2006. LDCs are defined in accordance with the classifica-
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Fig. 2 Number of MEAs in 2006—The World
Beyond the evolvement of MEA membership over time, we provide further de-
tails on the geographical spread of MEAs with the help of maps. In particular, we
display MEA membership—according to the definitions stated above—for both the
world and Europe in the year 2006. The figures clearly illustrate that there is a
region-specific impact influencing countries toward participation in MEAs.6 Obvi-
ously, countries in Europe ratify a good deal more MEAs than countries in Africa
or Asia (cf. Fig. 2). A closer look on Europe illustrates the discrepancies between
countries in different developing stages (see Fig. 3). Particularly Western European
economies are much more inclined to participate in MEAs than Central and Eastern
European ones. Consequently, in 2004, the enlargement of the EU by Central and
Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta is responsible for the decline in the
average number of MEAs of the EU.
At this point, in general, correlations between MEAs and economic, political, and
environmental determinants are easily to identify. But less obviously is the extent
of the “connectedness” of countries due to trade or investment agreements and the
accordant impact on MEA participation.
4 Determinants of MEA membership
We use a set of explanatory variables to capture the most important determinants
of MEA membership. In line with the aforementioned theoretical work on environ-
mental agreements, we include and distinguish between three groups of explanatory
variables: economic, political, and environmental covariates.
tion of United Nations’ Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS).
6Please notice that there are a few white areas in the maps indicating missing countries in our data.
612 P. Egger et al.
Fig. 3 Number of MEAs in 2006—Europe
4.1 Economic determinants
As for the economic determinants of MEA membership, we include real gross do-
mestic product (GDP) as a measure of a country’s economic mass from Maddison’s
(2003) historical time-series which is available for a large set of countries and years.
To cover more recent years, we extrapolate GDP data by using indices of the growth
of GDP at real US dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
2008. Similarly, we gather information about population size from these two sources.
The inclusion of log population together with log GDP accounts for size as well as
income per capita in the empirical models. In the tables, we use acronyms LGDP and
LPOP to refer to log GDP and log population, respectively.
Furthermore, we include a binary variable LDC which is unity for the least devel-
oped countries and zero otherwise. This indicator is provided by the United Nations
Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS). Among
the 186 countries in our data-set, 48 are LDCs according to that definition.
Finally, we include two economic determinants of primary interest to our study:
a measure of a country’s trade liberalization (i.e., the inverse of trade costs) and the
number of bilateral investment treaties. We refer to the former as TRADE LIBERAL
and to the latter as INVEST LIBERAL. TRADE LIBERAL measures the importance
of bilateral and multilateral trade costs—most importantly for us, it is a measure of bi-
lateral and multilateral trade facilitation, especially but not only, through preferential
trade agreement (PTA) membership. INVEST LIBERAL is a measure of a country’s
investment liberalization through bilateral investment treaties (BITs). While INVEST
LIBERAL simply reflects the number of BITs of a country, TRADE LIBERAL re-
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spects direct and indirect consequences of trade costs—such as PTA membership
for trade—as pointed out by work in international economics (see Anderson 1979;
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). We use the logarithm of total (direct and indi-
rect) consequences of trade frictions and trade liberalization as a measure of TRADE
LIBERAL.
TRADE LIBERAL is a constructed variable from a non-linear regression model,
following the approach to estimate gravity models by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). We calculate TRADE LIBERAL annually by using the corresponding values
of exporter and importer GDP and trade costs as well as PTA membership. Nominal
bilateral goods exports of country i to country j in year t in US dollars, Xijt , may be
expressed in the following way (see Feenstra 2004, for a discussion):
Xijt = GDPitGDPj tGDPWt t
1−σ
ij t Π
1−σ
it P
1−σ
jt , (1)
where GDPit ≡ ∑Nj (Xijt ), GDPj t ≡
∑N
i (Xjit ) denotes nominal GDP of countries
i and j , respectively, in year t , N denotes the number of countries in the world econ-
omy, and GDPWt ≡ ∑Ni
∑N
j (Xijt ) is world GDP in year t . σ > 1 is the constant
elasticity of substitution among products/varieties, tij t are economic trade costs (in-
cluding PTA membership indicators and other variables), and Πit , Pjt are so-called
multilateral resistance terms—measuring country i’s outward and country j ’s inward
multilateral trade costs, respectively, in year t . For our purpose, we calculate
TRADE LIBERALit = ln
N∑
j=1
j =i
(
GDPitGDPj t
GDPWt
t1−σij t Π
1−σ
it P
1−σ
jt
)
, (2)
which is the predicted sum of exports of country i to all countries in the world (i.e.,
the data-set) in year t .
Empirically, GDPit GDPj tGDPWt is observable, but t
1−σ
ij t Π
1−σ
it P
1−σ
jt is not. We adopt the
common assumption to model trade costs as
t1−σij t = exp
[
K∑
k
(δkτk,ij t )
]
, (3)
where K denotes the number of trade cost or trade facilitation variables τk,ij t included
in t1−σij t , and δk is a parameter of the k’th variable. While τk,ij t is observed, δk has to
be estimated. Estimates of δk are obtained from a gravity regression model, after in-
cluding a stochastic term in (1); see Appendix A.2 for details. For convenience and in
line with the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003), continuous variables
in τk,ij t such as bilateral geographical distance enter in logarithmic form while indi-
cator variables such as bilateral PTA membership enter as they are. Similar to t1−σij t ,
Π1−σit , and P
1−σ
jt are unobserved. Yet they can be solved as solutions of a non-linear
system of 2N equations which are based upon knowledge of GDPs and estimates of
t1−σij t (see Appendix A.2 for details). We use data on nominal exports Xijt in US dol-
lars from the United Nations World Trade Database, information on PTA membership
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from the World Bank, and variables on other trade costs (such as geographical dis-
tance, adjacency, or common language) from a data set made publicly available by the
Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Ultimately,
with estimates of t1−σij t , Π
1−σ
it , and P
1−σ
jt , we can estimate TRADE LIBERAL. We
can also compute counterfactual values of TRADE LIBERAL which are based on the
assumption that ceteris paribus all PTAs would be abandoned world-wide.7 The dif-
ference between the vector of TRADE LIBERAL with PTAs and the counterfactual
vector of TRADE LIBERAL without PTAs is a measure of the combined bilateral
and multilateral consequences of PTA membership on a country’s log exports. With
this difference and a parameter estimate of TRADE LIBERAL in the specification of
MEA memberships at hand, we can compute the total impact of PTA membership on
MEA membership (see Tables 7 to 10 in Sect. 6.2).
The impact of INVEST LIBERAL on MEA membership is straightforward. IN-
VEST LIBERAL reflects a country’s number of BITs in a given year.8 Information
on the number of BITs for each country and year is taken from the United Nations
Conference of Trade and Development Treaty Database (UNCTAD 2007). Similar to
MEA and PTA membership, the number of BITs varies considerably over time. If all
BITs were abandoned in all years in a counterfactual situation, INVEST LIBERAL
would represent a vector of zeros. Accordingly, after having estimated the parameter
of INVEST LIBERAL in a specification of MEA memberships, we can compare the
predicted number of MEA memberships for each country in a situation with BITs
(and INVEST LIBERAL) as observed as compared to one without any BITs.
4.2 Political determinants
We have experimented with a variety of political indicators from various sources in
the specification. For example, we included variables measuring the autocracy of a
country, the durability of a country’s political regime, and a variable measuring the
political competition in the government of a country. These variables are based on the
data collected in the Polity IV Project (see Marshall and Jaggers 2007). Most of them
did not exhibit sufficient variation over time to be included in the empirical model
and led to poor convergence properties of the GMM estimators.
Here, we only present results which involve the index of political freedom (PFI)
as constructed by the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney et al. 2007) as a political de-
terminant of MEA membership. This index ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values
indicating greater political freedom. Hereby, we confirm the results of Congleton
(1992) and Neumayer (2002) who found a positive systematical impact of political
institutions on environmental regulations.
7Abandoning PTAs will not only affect t1−σ
ij t
but also Π1−σ
it
and P 1−σ
jt
and even GDP. All of that has to
and will be taken into account when calculating counterfactual TRADE LIBERAL.
8It would be possible to allow for bilateral and multilateral effects of such treaties similar to trade costs
as in TRADE LIBERAL. However, unlike with trade costs there is no closed-form solution to capture
bilateral and multilateral (direct and indirect) effects of bilateral investment treaties. Also, we would not
expect similar strong multilateral effects of bilateral investment treaties as of preferential trade agreements.
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4.3 Environmental determinants
Finally, we include two environmental determinants of MEA membership: a coun-
try’s CO2 emissions per capita (CO2 EMISSIONS) and a country’s endowment with
agricultural land (in percent of its total land area; AGRLAND). Both of them are
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. We also experi-
mented with other variables such as total CO2 emissions from fossil-fuels (thousand
metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from solid fuel consumption (metric tons of
carbon), CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption (metric tons of carbon), CO2
emissions from gas fuel consumption (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from
cement production (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from gas flaring (metric
tons of carbon), CO2 emissions (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from gas
flaring, combustible renewables and waste (percent of total energy), combustible re-
newables and waste (metric tons of oil equivalent), electric power consumption (kWh
or kWh per capita), energy imports (net percent of energy use), energy use (kg of oil
equivalent per capita), forest area (sq. km), land area (sq. km), organic water pollu-
tant emissions (kg per day or kg per day per worker), permanent cropland (percent of
land area), surface area (sq. km), and water pollution (percent of total organic water
pollutant emissions) of the chemical industry, clay and glass industry, food industry,
metal industry, paper and pulp industry, textile industry, wood industry, and other
industries. All of them are available to download from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators. However, these environmental variables are highly collinear
with the included covariates (such as CO2 EMISSIONS and AGRLAND) and they
do not contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model.9
Please notice that not all of the mentioned possible determinants of MEA par-
ticipation are available for all of the 186 countries. After dropping those countries
for which determinants are missing, we are left with 105 economies of which 17 are
LDCs according to the definition of UN-OHRLLS. The subsequent regression results
are based on these 105 economies (see Table 1).
5 Econometric model
The descriptive features of the data on a country’s participation in MEAs over time
display a strong persistence. In any given period, the number of MEAs a country
participates in has a strong impact on its subsequent involvement in MEAs. Hence,
apart from fundamental economic, political, or environmental determinants of MEA
membership, a country’s MEA history should be allowed to play a role.10 This feature
may be captured by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the econometric
model. We do so by following Blundell et al. (2002) to model the dynamics of the
number of MEAs a country participates in as a linear feedback model (LFM). The
9Results are available from the authors upon request.
10If history matters, cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of MEA participation is difficult to
interpret since the estimated responses may reflect short-run or long-run effects.
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Table 1 Statistics of balanced data
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max
YEAR 4935 1983 13.5660 1960 2006
NUMBER OF MEAs (yit ) 4935 35.0315 36.4441 0 222
LGDP 4935 23.6735 2.1325 17.8967 30.0656
LPOP 4935 9.3836 1.4536 6.2085 14.0895
TRADE LIBERAL 4935 1.3396 1.8038 −4.1154 5.2542
INVEST LIBERAL 4935 9.9377 18.8965 0 131
LDC 4935 0.1603 0.3669 0 1
PFI 4935 3.8524 1.9589 1 9.6
CO2 EMISSIONS 4935 3.7618 4.4578 −0.0197 27.7664
AGRLAND 4935 42.4408 21.3902 0.6278 91.7850
LFM assumes that the conditional mean of a dependent count variable is linear in the
history of the process.11
Let yit denote the number of MEAs country i, i = 1, . . . ,N , is a member of in
year t , t = 1, . . . , T . Further, let xit represent a vector of K explanatory variables.
The conditional mean in the LFM is then defined as
E(yit |yit−1, xit , vi) = γyit−1 + exp
(
x′itβ
)
vi
= γyit−1 + μitνi, (4)
where νi ≡ exp(ηi) is a permanent scaling factor for the individual specific mean, and
γ and β are parameters to be estimated. The LFM can be motivated as an entry-exit
process with the probability of exit equal to (1 − γ ). Note that μitνi is non-negative,
so that the mean value for yit is bounded below by γyit−1.
To avoid simultaneity bias, every explanatory variable enters in their first lag into
our regressions. By this means, we are able to cancel out the Granger feedback system
between the number of MEAs and trade and investment treaties.12 Using the lagged
values of the explanatory variables relies on the plausible assumption that past values
of the explanatory variables influence future development of the number of MEAs
but does not affect past ones. Using this time structure, we make sure that the impact
of trade and investment treaties goes in the right direction.
For estimation, we apply a quasi-differencing transformation following
Wooldridge (1997). This GMM estimator can deal with potentially endogenous re-
gressors where E(xituit ) = 0. Hence, as for example, TRADE LIBERAL or INVEST
LIBERAL may be endogenous, we employ the following valid moment conditions:
11For a good overview article of GMM for panel count data models, see Windmeijer (2000, 2008) and
Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997).
12Rose and Spiegel (2009) show a positive impact of environmental agreements on bilateral trade flows.
We use the number of MEAs as the dependent variable and trade as the explanatory one.
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E(qit |yit−2, xit−2) = 0, where qit are the regression residuals due to the transforma-
tion (for more details, see Appendix A.1).
We apply several generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. First, we
use a one-step estimator, where the moments weighting matrix does not depend on
the parameters to be estimated. In order to gain in efficiency, we also apply an efficient
two-step GMM which uses the estimates from the one-step estimator for the moments
weighting matrix. Additionally, we apply a continuously updated GMM estimator
that directly accounts for the dependence of the moments weighting matrix on the
parameters in the optimization (see Hansen et al. 1996).13
As demonstrated by Windmeijer (2002), the two-step GMM estimator can be
severely biased downward in small samples, i.e., for small N . This small sample
bias also applies to the continuously updating GMM estimator. We therefore use a
finite sample correction in order to account for the small sample bias by applying
block-bootstrapping.14 Further details on the applied estimators can be found in Ap-
pendix A.1. Because results of the block-bootstrapping approach are very close to
parameter estimates as well as significance levels of the one-step estimator, we pri-
marily refer to one-step estimation results.
6 Results
This section is structured as follows. We will first summarize the parameter estimates
of four different GMM estimators based on the aforementioned empirical specifi-
cation of MEA participation. Then we will ask how important interconnectedness
through trade and investment policy is for MEA participation in quantitative terms.
Clearly, the non-linear nature of the econometric model does not allow for a straight-
forward answer to that question which only rests upon parameter estimates. To shed
light on the matter, let us focus on the role of trade liberalization and undertake some
radical experiments. First, let us abandon all PTAs concluded world-wide in all years
covered in our data set. Second, let us abandon all BITs in the same way. These ex-
periments are helpful to quantify the relative as well as the absolute role of trade and
investment liberalization for MEA participation.
6.1 Parameter estimates
Our results are summarized in Tables 2, 3, 4. In every table, there are four columns.
The first column refers to results based on the one-step GMM estimator, labeled
“ONE-STEP”, column two reports estimates based on the efficient two-step GMM
estimator, denoted by “TWO-STEP”, the third column summarizes findings based on
the continuously updated GMM estimates, labeled “CUGMM”, and the last column
13Additionally to the efficiency, an advantage of the continuously updated estimator is that it is invariant
to curvature altering transformations of the population moment conditions (see Hall 2005).
14For the one-step and two-step GMM estimators, we relied on the EXPEND GAUSS routines which are
made publicly available by Windmeijer (2002). An alternative possibility to account for the small sample
bias was proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
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Table 2 Baseline parameter estimates
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM BOOT-STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
yit−1 0.1797*** 0.1805*** 0.1796*** 0.1856***
(10.7874) (61.3027) (189.5914) (8.2044)
Economic determinants:
LGDPit−1 0.5831*** 0.5835*** 0.5430*** 0.5706***
(8.9630) (133.3069) (115.8703) (6.2472)
LPOPit−1 0.0662 0.0725*** 0.8542*** 0.0575
(0.9534) (7.8487) (48.3054) (0.9184)
TRADE 0.3568*** 0.3573*** 0.4470*** 0.3478***
LIBERALit−1 (6.0775) (47.9151) (334.3223) (5.0946)
INVEST 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0035*** 0.0060***
LIBERALit−1 (5.3570) (34.8477) (68.5053) (4.7232)
LDCit−1 0.0792 0.0905 1.8611*** 0.0268
(0.2288) (0.3333) (6.5934) (0.1023)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that parameters are significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and 4,725 observations in all four models. The param-
eters are estimated over the period 1962–2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for
1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying restrictions is 0.1563 in the ONE-STEP
model
reflects block-bootstrap results, denoted “BOOTSTRAP”, which correct the small-
sample bias in the estimates of the standard errors of the other estimators.
In all our specifications, the instruments turn out to be valid at conventional sig-
nificance levels according to the Sargan over-identification test. We further tested for
first-order and second-order serial correlation. With residuals of the quasi-differenced
transformation following Wooldridge, we expect first-order but not second-order se-
rial correlation. We confirm this pattern largely in our estimates.
The lagged dependent variable, labeled as “yit−1”, exhibits a positive parame-
ter estimate which is significantly different from zero in all models. This suggests
that there is indeed strong persistence in the number of MEAs joined by countries.
Neglecting this persistence and sluggish adjustment in response to changes in its
determinants would likely invalidate estimates based on static models of MEA mem-
bership.
An increase in economic mass, as captured by LGDP, leads to an increase in the
number of MEAs ratified by a country. Holding population constant, this suggests
that marginally wealthier countries are more inclined toward MEA participation than
less wealthier ones. This statistically significant result occurs in all model estimations
and is consistent with the Environmental Kuznets Curve which assumes an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the level of GDP and environmental pollution.
Smaller values of GDP are associated with less production, and hence less pollu-
tion. As GDP rises, an increase in production brings about more pollution. With even
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Table 3 Parameter estimates including political determinants
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM BOOT-STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
yit−1 0.1725*** 0.1727*** 0.1347*** 0.1849***
(10.3005) (53.6281) (100.5466) (6.4990)
Economic determinants:
LGDPit−1 0.5768*** 0.5783*** 0.4608*** 0.5463***
(8.6261) (100.9385) (86.6106) (5.7752)
LPOPit−1 0.0674 0.0718*** 0.9579*** 0.0649
(0.9721) (8.1776) (46.3741) (1.0241)
TRADE 0.3496*** 0.3487*** 0.3785*** 0.3327***
LIBERALit−1 (5.7095) (43.7934) (310.7697) (4.7985)
INVEST 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0065*** 0.0059***
LIBERALit−1 (5.3410) (32.0974) (88.1588) (4.5845)
LDCit−1 0.1008 0.1137 1.0589*** 0.0382
(0.2917) (0.4210) (3.7494) (0.1385)
Political determinants:
PFIit−1 0.0096*** 0.0095*** 0.0025*** 0.0239
(8.9747) (31.9805) (27.9396) (0.9910)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that parameters are significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and 4,725 observations in all four models. The param-
eters are estimated over the period 1962–2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for
1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying restrictions is 0.1518 in the ONE-STEP
model
higher GDP, producers may face pressure toward reducing pollution in spite of higher
production volumes. Then it may be opportune to engage in multilateral agreements.
Our results are supportive to this positive nexus between GDP and a country’s will-
ingness to reduce pollution, indicated by a higher count of MEAs.15
Results do not support an important role for log population (LPOP). Controlling
for a country’s economic mass in terms of LGDP a change in population size has no
significant impact on the number of MEAs ratified by the average country. In con-
trast, political freedom affects MEA membership positively and significantly. Hence,
a higher degree of political stability and democracy tends to stimulate a country’s
willingness to engage in international agreements such as MEAs, all else equal. In
line with our expectations, a higher degree of pollution in terms of CO2 emissions
reduces a country’s willingness to commit itself to less pollution through MEAs.
However, the negative estimate of CO2 EMISSIONS is not significantly different
15Please notice that this conclusion cannot be contradicted by the insignificant impact of LDC on MEA
memberships if controlling for other determinants (cf. LDC in Tables 2 to 4).
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Table 4 Parameter estimates including environmental determinants
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM BOOT-STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
yit−1 0.1785*** 0.1768*** 0.1385*** 0.1904***
(9.1892) (44.3985) (64.0840) (6.1541)
Economic determinants:
LGDPit−1 0.5826*** 0.5879*** 0.7244*** 0.5593***
(8.2293) (74.0002) (100.7637) (5.4012)
LPOPit−1 0.0518 0.0581*** 0.3919*** 0.0460
(0.7663) (6.9987) (39.4304) (0.6796)
TRADE 0.3397*** 0.2759*** 0.3919*** 0.3283***
LIBERALit−1 (5.7570) (44.2835) (58.1982) (4.8224)
INVEST 0.0060*** 0.0030*** 0.0001*** 0.0060***
LIBERALit−1 (5.6497) (33.5298) (23.0466) (4.6575)
LDCit−1 0.1099 0.1248 0.5887∗ 0.0471
(0.3230) (0.4642) (2.1911) (0.1780)
Political determinants:
PFIit−1 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 0.0080*** 0.0238
(8.6713) (35.0827) (116.5932) (0.9368)
Environmental determinants:
CO2 −0.0080 −0.0085*** −0.0306*** −0.0091
EMISSIONSit−1 (−0.8530) (−6.7420) (−39.7536) (−0.6205)
AGRLANDit−1 −0.0026 −0.0024*** 0.0037*** −0.0021
(−0.8803) (−5.3820) (21.1946) (−0.6117)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that parameters are significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and 4,725 observations in all four models. The param-
eters are estimated over the period 1962–2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for
1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying restrictions is 0.1544 in the ONE-STEP
model
from zero at conventional levels (cf. ONE-STEP or BOOTSTRAP results in Tables 2
to 4).
Results stated above are based on MEAs unclassified with respect to their environ-
mental issue. To shed light on different cluster-specific relationships between trade
and investment liberalization, we also ran separate regressions with different clusters
of MEAs, namely the ones dealing with biodiversity, atmosphere, land, chemicals
and hazardous wastes, and seas.16 Table 5 provides descriptive details about the re-
16This classification is analogous to the MEA clusters of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP 2001).
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Table 5 Statistics of balanced data for different clusters of MEAs
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
CLUSTER BIODIVERSITY 4935 3.9645 4.4206 0 27
CLUSTER ATMOSPHERE 4935 3.7929 5.4179 0 30
CLUSTER LAND 4935 2.8845 2.7611 0 21
CLUSTER CHEMICALS 4935 8.4548 8.4908 0 48
CLUSTER SEAS 4935 12.8917 15.2388 0 94
garded MEA clusters. Here, maximum numbers of MEAs suggest that countries are
most likely to sign and ratify MEAs in the context of maritime issues (CLUSTER
SEAS), followed by MEAs dealing with chemicals and hazardous wastes (CLUS-
TER CHEMICALS). Less MEAs have been ratified with respect to biodiversity, at-
mosphere, or land. Table 6 summarizes one-step dynamic GMM regression results
akin to the ones in the first column of Table 4. For convenience, we repeat the one-
step results from Table 4 in the first column of Table 6.
Basically, results in Table 6 draw a similar picture to the one obtained in Table 4.
A coefficient which is significantly different from zero in the benchmark estimates
in the first column always exhibits a similar sign in the cluster-specific regressions.
Most of the determinants show a similar qualitative and quantitative point estimate
across the different clusters. For instance, better economic (GDP) and political (PFI)
circumstances move countries to ratify more MEAs. TRADE LIBERAL has a pos-
itive and highly significant effect with similar magnitude in all regressions, except
for the cluster atmosphere. However, for this cluster, we had to set the lag length
of the instrument for the number of MEAs strictly to two to achieve convergence.
Since MEAs in this category are very persistent, the instrument explained almost all
of the variation in the number of atmosphere MEAs. This becomes evident having
a look at the parameter of the lagged dependent variable which is close to unity for
that MEA cluster. Hence, these results have to be taken with a grain of salt. INVEST
LIBERAL indicates a positive impact in all clusters. The corresponding parameter is
positive, highly significant, and of similar magnitude in the regressions of the clusters
biodiversity, land, and chemicals and hazardous wastes. But it does not have a sig-
nificant impact on atmosphere—probably due to econometric reasons regarding the
persistence of the dependent variable—and on maritime issues (cf. the last column
of Table 6). Finally, if anything, a higher degree of per capita CO2 emissions leads
to a lower number of MEAs, as we can find negative and significant impacts of CO2
EMISSIONS in the clusters land and chemicals and hazardous wastes.
Above all, our results can support the notion that a country’s interconnectedness
in terms of trade and investment raises its incentive to engage in MEAs, also. Both
investment liberalization, captured by INVEST LIBERAL, and trade liberalization,
reflected in TRADE LIBERAL, lead to an increase in the number of MEAs. While
the immediate effect on MEAs due to the number of BITs is directly reflected in the
parameter estimate of INVEST LIBERAL, the role of PTAs is not immediately obvi-
ous from the parameter of TRADE LIBERAL. The reason is that PTAs are related to
TRADE LIBERAL in a highly non-linear way. There is a positive effect of PTA on
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Table 6 Parameter estimates for different clusters of MEAs
Number of
MEAs
Bio-
diversity
(number
of MEAs)
Atmo-
sphere
(number
of MEAs)
Land
(number
of MEAs)
Chemicals
(number
of MEAs)
Seas
(number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
yit−1 0.1785***
yBIODIVERSITY
it−1 0.0248
yATMOSPHERE
it−1 0.9997***
yLAND
it−1 0.0359
yCHEMICALS
it−1 0.1088***
ySEAS
it−1 0.1283***
Economic determinants:
LGDPit−1 0.5826*** 0.7783*** 0.8787 0.2248*** 0.7265*** 0.6430***
LPOPit−1 0.0518 0.0196 −0.0478 0.2399** 0.0070 0.0773
TRADE 0.3397*** 0.5522*** 0.6090 0.2265** 0.5300*** 0.4185***
LIBERALit−1
INVEST 0.0060*** 0.0061*** 0.0034 0.0035*** 0.0022*** 0.0006
LIBERALit−1
LDCit−1 0.1099 0.7622** −0.1381 −0.1566 −0.1816 0.0781
Political determinants:
PFIit−1 0.0092*** 0.0245*** 0.0343 0.0023 0.0060** 0.0023
Environmental determinants:
CO2 −0.0080 −0.0153 0.1078 −0.0087** −0.0180* 0.0019
EMISSIONSit−1
AGRLANDit−1 −0.0026 0.0016 −0.0063 0.0031 0.0012 0.0002
Notes: *, **, *** indicates that parameters are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are
105 countries and 4,725 observations in all six ONE-STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over
the period 1962–2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are
used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962)
TRADE LIBERAL,17 which is fully in line with findings reported in the literature on
the consequences of trade liberalization for trade flows (for instance, see Baier and
Bergstrand 2007, 2009). Consequently, a significant positive impact of PTA member-
ship on TRADE LIBERAL together with a positive significant parameter of TRADE
LIBERAL implies a positive effect of PTA membership for MEA participation.
Altogether, the results support the view that wealthier countries with a strong in-
clination toward trade and investment liberalization are more in favor of commit-
ting themselves voluntarily to environmental standards, pollution reduction, and other
17The corresponding parameter is 0.022.
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Table 7 Trade liberalization in
the EU EU Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 12 15 112 100
Min 1 11 10
Max 28 240 212
Std. dev. 7 61 55
Table 8 Trade liberalization in
the NAFTA NAFTA Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 2 2 75 73
Min 1 59 58
Max 2 99 97
Std. dev. 1 21 21
means of environmental protection through MEA memberships than other countries,
all else equal. At least to some extent, this finding is at odds with concerns of envi-
ronmental activists whereby the globalization of goods trade and investments would
be unambiguously detrimental for pro-environmental movements and environmental
protection.
6.2 The role of preferential trade liberalization for MEA participation
Shutting down PTAs affects TRADE LIBERAL through three types of channels. First
of all, it changes nominal exports in (1) directly through the trade cost term t1−σij . Sec-
ond, it affects exports indirectly (and in the opposite way) through both exporter and
importer multilateral resistance terms Πi and Pj , respectively. Third, by affecting
exports it exerts an indirect effect on exporter, importer, and world GDP. Since GDPs
and the number of PTAs concluded across the years, TRADE LIBERAL is a time-
variant variable and the impact on TRADE LIBERAL of abandoning PTAs coun-
terfactually is heterogeneous across the years. The time-specific effect of TRADE
LIBERAL is then scaled by the corresponding parameter estimate. However, notice
that even a homogeneous change in TRADE LIBERAL across countries and years
would turn into heterogeneous effects on MEA membership by virtue of the non-
linear nature of the econometric model. The impact of PTA membership on MEA
participation is computed ceteris paribus as the difference between the model predic-
tions for MEA participation with PTAs (see column 4 of Tables 7, 8, 9, 10) and the
ones without any PTAs (see the last column of Tables 7, 8, 9, 10). For predictions as
well as counterfactual predictions, we take ONE STEP estimates from Table 4 as a
basis.
624 P. Egger et al.
Table 9 Trade liberalization in
the ROW ROW Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 1 2 45 44
Min 0 5 5
Max 10 161 157
Std. dev. 2 31 30
Table 10 Trade liberalization
in the WORLD WORLD Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 4 5 62 58
Min 0 5 5
Max 28 240 212
Std. dev. 6 49 44
For the ease of presentation, let us focus on a quantification of PTA-induced ef-
fects on MEA participation in just one year, namely 2006, i.e., the last year in our
data. Notice that the impact of PTA membership on the number of MEAs is larger in
2006 than in the 1960s, since the number of PTAs in place by 2006 was larger. Tables
7 to 10 summarize the quantitative effects of PTAs in that year. There are four ta-
bles, since we compute effects for different country-groups: European Union (EU18),
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA19), the rest of the world (ROW), and the
whole world covered (i.e., 105 economies).
Each table has got four rows of data and four columns. The last two columns
report absolute predictions of MEAs ratified with and without PTAs for the average
country (in the top row) in each group considered in 2006.20 For the mean, the first
column is simply the difference between the last two columns in each table. This
is, of course, not the case for the minimum predictions, maximum predictions, and
standard deviations of predictions.
Please notice that the first column represents short-run—or contemporaneous—
effects of PTA membership in 2006. Introducing all existing PTAs in 2006 relative to
a situation without any PTAs leads to an increase of about 4 MEAs for the average
country in the sample (see the upper left number in Table 10). The effect is much
18Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden.
19Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
20We also report minimum and maximum effects along with the standard deviation of the effects across
the countries in each group.
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Table 11 Investment
liberalization in the EU EU Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 32 39 112 80
Min 0 11 9
Max 108 240 145
Std. dev. 30 61 35
Table 12 Investment
liberalization in the NAFTA NAFTA Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 12 15 74 62
Min 6 59 54
Max 24 99 75
Std. dev. 10 21 12
lower in absolute terms for countries in the ROW (see the upper left number in Ta-
ble 9), and it is highest for EU member countries (see the upper left number in Table
7). The second column covers long-run effects. While short-run effects are defined as

yshort-runit = exp
(
xcounterfactualit βˆ
) − exp(xbenchmarkit βˆ
)
,
long-run effect are accumulated responses until a new steady-state effect is reached,
and they are defined as

y
long-run
it =
1
1 − γˆ
[
exp
(
xcounterfactualit βˆ
) − exp(xbenchmarkit βˆ
)]
.
Among the four considered country-groups, the EU is the one with the largest num-
ber of PTAs with other countries, while the ROW is the one with the smallest number
of PTAs. All things considered, our results point to a monotonic positive relation-
ship between a country’s degree of preferential trade liberalization and the extent of
voluntary environmental commitments in terms of the number of MEAs ratified.
6.3 The role of bilateral investment treaties for MEA participation
In a similar vein, we may investigate the role of BITs for MEA membership. We
shut down BITs as before and compare the outcome in a situation with BITs (where
INVEST LIBERAL corresponds to the number of BITs in place in a given year) with
one without BITs (where INVEST LIBERAL is a vector of zeros).
Tables 11, 12, 13, 14 summarize the quantitative effects of INVEST LIBERAL
again for the year 2006. Notice that—similar to TRADE LIBERAL—the impact of
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Table 13 Investment
liberalization in the ROW ROW Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 7 10 45 38
Min 0 5 5
Max 54 161 134
Std. dev. 10 31 23
Table 14 Investment
liberalization in the WORLD WORLD Difference in predic-
tion and counterfac-
tual prediction
Prediction
of MEA
Counterfactual
prediction
of MEA
Short run Long run
Mean 13 16 61 48
Min 0 5 5
Max 108 240 145
Std. dev. 20 49 32
INVEST LIBERAL on MEA participation will be large in 2006 compared to 1960,
since the number of BITs in place by 2006 is larger than the years before. There are
again four tables summarizing the effects for EU, NAFTA, ROW, and WORLD. As
explained above the last two columns report absolute predictions of MEAs ratified
with and without INVEST LIBERAL for the average country (in the top row) in each
group considered in 2006.21 The first column is simply the difference between the last
two columns in each table and represents short-run—or contemporaneous—effects of
INVEST LIBERAL. Introducing all existing INVEST LIBERAL in 2006 relative to
a situation with zero BITs leads to an increase of about 13 MEAs for the average
country included (see the upper left number in Table 14). Similar to the case of PTAs,
the effect of INVEST LIBERAL in absolute terms for countries in the ROW is well
below the one for EU member countries, which is the highest.
Summing up Sects. 6.2 and 6.3, results suggest that for the average economy in
the world (see Table 10 and Table 14) the number of MEAs ratified would be pre-
dicted to drop by more than one-fifteenth if all preferential trade agreements would
be abandoned, and by more than one-fifth for the case of bilateral investment treaties.
Even though the nexus between environmental protection and MEA participation is
not trivial, we argue that such a large change in international cooperation in terms
of environmental agreements could bring about detrimental effects for environmental
protection.
21We also report minimum and maximum effects along with the standard deviation of the effects across
the countries in each group.
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Table 15 Average marginal effects of TRADE LIBERAL
EU NAFTA ROW WORLD
AME 66.23 55.09 55.28 84.55
Notes: Figures are percentage changes of MEA counts in response to a one-standard deviation change of
TRADE LIBERAL
Table 16 Average marginal effects of INVEST LIBERAL
EU NAFTA ROW WORLD
AME 17.76 9.24 9.48 12.01
Notes: Figures are percentage changes of MEA counts in response to a one-standard deviation change of
INVEST LIBERAL
6.4 Marginal effects of trade and investment liberalization for MEA participation
Besides counterfactual predictions, we also compute average effects of a one-standard
deviation increase (AME) of TRADE LIBERAL and INVEST LIBERAL, alterna-
tively, for the EU, NAFTA, ROW, and the whole world. Due to the corresponding
β-coefficients, AMEs of TRADE LIBERAL (see Table 15) are higher than the ones
of INVEST LIBERAL (see Table 16).
7 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether preferential liberalizations of trade or investment
work as stepping stones or stumbling blocks to the formation of environmental
agreements. While environmental activists seem to assume the former, we provide
evidence supporting the latter from multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
which regulate environmental protection (related to the five core issues biodiversity,
atmosphere, land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and regional seas and related
agreements) between 1960 and 2006.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the determinants of the number of MEAs a
country participates in. Such an analysis should respect two features of the data on
MEAs. First, the number of MEAs a country is a member of is a discrete variable,
a count. Second, MEA participation at the country level is a rather persistent phe-
nomenon and calls for dynamic analysis. Accordingly, we base our inference on a
dynamic (linear feedback) model for count data by Blundell et al. (2002). The ob-
tained parameter estimates are used to assess the impact of trade and investment lib-
eralization in the short run and the long run for all 105 countries in our sample (the
world) and groups thereof.
The findings strongly support the view that both trade and investment liberaliza-
tion stimulate MEA participation. Economically large countries and, especially, ones
with many preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties in place are
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more likely to ratify MEAs. Across country groups, their impact on MEA member-
ship is strongest for the member countries of the European Union and it is weakest
for (mostly least developed) countries in the rest of the world.
However, future research will be needed to look behind the number of MEAs as a
measure of cooperation on environmental issues. It is not necessarily the case that a
country’s membership in more MEAs is indicative of higher environmental standards,
nor is it clear that participating in the next MEA for a country that participates in many
already is the same as entering the first one. However, as welcome research on such
matters would be, it requires a major effort in terms of data collection.
Appendix
A.1 Econometric model
A complication in estimating the econometric model arises as the within group mean
scaling estimator will be inconsistent for small T , since the lagged dependent variable
is predetermined.22 For estimation by the generalized method of moments (GMM),
the LFM may be quasi-differenced (see Wooldridge 1997) with
qit =
yit − ∑pj=1 γjyit−j
μit
− yit−1 −
∑p
j=1 γjyit−1−j
μit−1
. (A.1)
The quasi-differencing transformation following Wooldridge (1997) has the advan-
tage that it can deal with potentially endogenous regressors. Regressors are endoge-
nous when E(xituit ) = 0. Hence, for endogenous xit , the following moment condi-
tions are valid: E(qit |yit−2, xit−1) = 0.
Define θ = [γ1, . . . , γp,β ′]′. Then the GMM estimator minimizes
θˆ = arg min
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi(θ)
′Zi
)
W−1N
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z′iqi(θ)
)
, (A.2)
where qi is the T − p − 1 vector of residuals [qit ], Zi is the matrix of instruments
and WN is a weights matrix. We use the full set of sequential instruments so that Zi
is given by
Zi =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
yi1 xi1 xi2
. . .
yi1 · · · yiT −2 xi1 · · · xiT −1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ . (A.3)
The efficient weights matrix for the moments is defined as
WN(θˆ1) =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z′iqi
(
θˆ1
)
qi
(
θˆ1
)′
Zi
)−1
. (A.4)
22That is, it is correlated with shocks in the past so that E(xit uit+j ) = 0, j ≥ 0, and E(xit uit−s ) = 0,
s ≥ 1.
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The one-step GMM estimator θˆ1 uses WN = ( 1N
∑N
i=1 Z′iZi)−1 as the initial
weights matrix. The asymptotic variance of θˆ1 may be computed as
ˆvar(θˆ1) = 1
N
(
C
(
θˆ1
)′
WNC
(
θˆ1
))−1
WNW
−1
N
(
θˆ1
)
WNC
(
θˆ1
)(
C
(
θˆ1
)′
WNC
(
θˆ1
))−1
,
(A.5)
where
C
(
θˆ1
) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
∂Z′iqi(θ)
∂θ
∣
∣
∣
∣
θˆ1
. (A.6)
The efficient two-step GMM estimator θˆ2 uses the efficient weights matrix
WN(θˆ1), where qi(θˆ1) is based on the one-step estimates θˆ1. The asymptotic vari-
ance of the efficient two-step GMM estimator is computed as
ˆvar(θˆ2
) = 1
N
(
C
(
θˆ2
)′
WNC
(
θˆ2
))−1
. (A.7)
Hansen et al. (1996) suggest to directly account for the dependence of WN on θ
in the optimization, an estimator known as the continuous updating GMM estima-
tor in the literature. The main advantage of the latter estimator is that it is invariant
to curvature altering transformations of the population moment conditions (see Hall
2005).
Because of the small sample bias of the two-step GMM estimator (see Windmeijer
2002), we additionally use a finite sample correction based on block-bootstrapping.
In order to preserve the time-structure of the data, we construct our bootstrap samples
by drawing from the pool of 105 countries 2,000 times with replacement, and then
take for every drawn country all observations over time. We then calculate the mean
and standard observations over the 2,000 bootstraps for every estimated coefficient,
leading to our estimates for the block-bootstrap. As the draws are taken from the
sample, the finite-sample properties of our sample are preserved for the bootstrapped
standard errors. For more details on the properties of the bootstrap method, see, for
example, Chap. 11 in Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
A.2 Multilateral resistance terms
Even though multilateral resistance terms are unobserved, they can be obtained as
solutions to the system of non-linear equations of the form
Π1−σit =
N∑
j=1
(
Pσ−1j t θj t t
1−σ
ij t
) ∀i, t, θjt = yjt
yWt
∀j, t, (A.8)
P 1−σjt =
N∑
i=1
(
Πσ−1it θit t
1−σ
ij t
) ∀j, t, θit = yit
yWt
∀i, t. (A.9)
To solve for Π1−σit and P
1−σ
jt , we only need to know nominal GDPs and bilateral
economic trade costs. However, while GDPs may be directly gathered from statisti-
cal sources, this is impossible for economic trade costs. Typically, trade economists
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model them as tij t ≡ ez′ij tβ , where zij t is a vector of observable trade barrier variables
and β is a corresponding vector of unobservable (but estimable) parameters relating
the elements of zij t to tij t .
Specifically, we use the following observable variables as elements of zij t : bilat-
eral geographical distance between countries i and j ; an indicator of contiguity of
countries i and j which is unity if two countries have a common land border and
zero otherwise; a common language indicator which is unity if countries i and j
have a common official language and zero otherwise; a continent dummy which is
unity if two countries are located at the same continent; a colony indicator which is
unity if two countries had a colonial relationship in the past; a current colony indi-
cator which is unity if two countries had a colonial relationship after World War II;
an indicator which is unity if the two units i and j form one country (such as Den-
mark and Greenland); and a preferential trade agreement indicator which is unity if
two countries belong to such an agreement in a given year.23 All variables except
for preferential trade agreement memberships are time-invariant and collected from
the geographical data set made available by the Centre d’Études Prospectives et In-
ternationales (CEPII). We estimate the parameters β by means of a cross-sectional
regression model based on data of the year 2006.
Potential trade flows are defined as the model predictions using (1) and (A.8) and
estimates of the parameters β from a cross-sectional model with fixed country effects
for the year 2006. Notice that neighboring countries’ weighted GDP and population
exhibit time variation for two reasons: First, GDP and population change over time
and so does weighted GDP and population; second, potential trade weights change
since GDPs change, preferential trade agreement membership changes, and, indi-
rectly, the multilateral resistance terms in (A.8) change through GDP and preferential
trade agreement memberships.
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